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RECOVERING FROM TRUST BREAKDOWNS IN LARGE SYSTEM
IMPLEMENTATIONS
Bjarne Rerup Schlichter* brs@asb.dk
Povl Erik Rostgaard Andersen*
*Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University, Denmark

Abstract
On the basis of experiences from the Faroese large-scale implementation of integrated healthcare
information systems and insights into dynamic aspects of trust, we offer the following lessons learned for the
successful management and recovery of trust (breakdowns) in large system implementations: restore
relations by turning towards face-to-face events and procedures, assure a well-functioning and available
support organization, demonstrate trust in actors to enhance their own self-confidence and celebrate
successes, even the smallest or ones injected by yourself. The propositions are based on a 6-year
longitudinal qualitative case study and analyzed using critical incidents and content analysis. The
propositions were discussed in a seminar with project participants. Finally the findings are challenged and
sharpened and suggestions for further research are given.
Keywords: Trust, Implementation, Breakdown, Recovery, Prescriptive findings, Healthcare

1

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Aspects of trust during information systems implementation projects have been recognised as important and
the presence of a high level of trust among project participants is seen as a critical success factor that must be
fulfilled to reach the goals of the project (Gefen, 2004). Even though many authors have addressed what trust
is and the consequences of a lack of trust between actors, not many have included trust relations between
actors and the project as such – and even fewer have been prescriptive, giving actual recommendations for
how to recover from trust breakdowns. On the basis of an analysis of the dynamic aspects of trust during a
major Faroese implementation of an integrated healthcare information system (IHIS), it is concluded that it is
beneficial to take direct action to meet three criteria: to focus on how to keep the project in a trustworthy
state; to take actions to let actors meet face to face or face a relevant version of the IT system; and to keep
the actors’ self-confidence on a high level.
The paper will develop a number of prescriptive pieces of advice on how to recover from trust breakdowns
in large implementations of information technology systems. The paper is organised as follows. After the
research approach the context of trust (breakdowns) is presented by recapitulating fundamental aspects of
trust, by introducing the case and by accounting for three incidents of trust breakdowns and recovery, thus
classifying the incidents. Then the incidents are analysed, which leads to the prescriptive advice and a
recommendation for how to identify trust breakdowns and initiate the related recovery actions. The final
section concludes with some implications for future research and practice.
As trust perceptions are subjective phenomena this study follows an interpretative qualitative approach
(Walsham, 1993). The study was based on a systematic data collection strategy that included multiple data
sources, semi-structured data collection and electronic data recording and transcription. It relied on 3
empirical sources: participant observation, individual semi-structured interviews with all levels of the
organisation and document studies. In this longitudinal study 17 actors, selected to represent the principal

IHIS project stakeholders, were interviewed twice a year from the summer of 2005 until early 2009 to
balance frequent collection of interviews with practical needs for clustering interviewing around fixed point
in time – and for convenience due the efficiency. The first slice of interviews was done just after signing of
the implementation contract before the actual implantation commenced, where the last slice was done during
the final implementation of last ward at the main hospital. By using a longitudinal approach it is possible to
follow the development of trust over time.
The empirical analysis was conducted in a three-stage process using content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004),
supplemented by critical incident analysis (Flanagan, 1954). The first stage aimed at developing an
understanding of the empirical materials through the lens of modernity and trust (Giddens, 1990; Schlichter
& Rose, 2009), while the second stage was concerned with understanding the dynamic elements of trust in
the specific context (Strauss & Corbin, 1994; Schlichter & Rose, 2009). In the third stage, which is reported
in the present paper, normative aspects from the theory of critical success factors (Francoise et al, 2009)
structured the formation of prescriptive recommendations (Gregor, 2006) for how to recover from trust
breakdowns. The recommendations were challenged and structured during a workshop with academics and
practitioners from the case organisation in late March 2010.

Figure 1: Methodology
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Figure 1 above provides an overview of the methodology used in the paper. Based on more than 50 semi
structured interviews, participant observation and document studies, the narrative of three trust breakdowns
were written. The breakdowns are summarised in table 1: “Incidents”. By reading the narrative, positive as
well as negative trust conditions and consequences were identified (and “marked” with a letter to assure

forward and backward traceability) and placed in tables 2 and 3. Then the interventions used to “change”
(“recover” from) the negative to the positive trust conditions were identified in the narrative. The narrative,
the related trust conditions and consequences and the interventions were then presented and challenged at a
seminar with a broad representation of actors leading to feedback consisting of more than 30 comments and
suggestions. Finally 4 propositions for trust recovery were derived from the analysis.

2

THE CONTEXT OF TRUST

The author was involved as an observer when the project was planned and during the full implementation
period from 2005 until 2010. The main purpose of the involvement was to understand and identify what trust
was in this context and how dynamic aspects of trust could be explained. Even though the implementation
project faced huge problems, the management succeeded in achieving the goals and the IHIS is now (spring
2010) fully functional in both the primary and the secondary healthcare sectors. In the following text three
incidents in which the project was challenged by declining levels of trust are described.
A letter in parentheses, e.g. “(A)”, indicate a point in the text to which reference is made at a later stage
during the analysis, where (letters+number) refers to interviews done:
CD:

nn:

Interview Number

NUR: Nurse

PM:

Project Manager

CIO:

Chief Information Officer

DM:

Deputy Minister

HD:

Hospital Director

GP:

General Practitioner

2.1

Consulting Doctor

Trust

Trust studies are a well-established part of the information systems literature and play an important role in
three principal enquiry domains:
 eCommerce; customer’s trust in the vendor is understood to be an important factor in the decision to buy
 virtual organizations, teams and communities; trust between individuals is influential in the collaboration
relationship
 inter-organizational systems; organizational co-operation is dependent on trust
The presence of trust is widely understood as a critical success factor (CSF: Bullen & Rockart, 1981) for the
achievement of the successful implementation of information systems (Somers & Nelson, 2001; Akkermans
& Helden, 2002; Sun et al, 2005; Schlichter, 2010).
Trust can be understood as
 a process (Komiak & Benbasat 2008); it can be established, built, lost, regained over time;
 an individualized continuum. This means that trust levels can vary (trust can break down and be
restored), and that individual actors can have different trust levels at the same time (Schlichter 2010) or
 as trust in an organizational system (Lowe and Locke 2008).
According to Gefen (2004), trust (in the context of an implementation project) is ‘the belief that others upon
whom one depends, yet has little control over, will not take advantage of the situation by behaving in an
opportunistic manner but, rather, will fulfil their expected commitments by behaving ethically, dependably
and fairly, especially under conditions involving risk and potential loss’. Trust is furthermore shown to have
positive consequences by having influence on co-operation and commitment between actors (Rajiv 1999;
Salam, Iyer et al. 2001), reduces complexity (Lander et al 2004) and is crucial to establishing positive results
during implementation (Scott and Kaindl 2000; Somers and Nelson 2001; Lander, Purvis et al. 2004; Wang
and Chen 2006). Trust is ‘important for ERP customization clients in determining their assessment of the
relationship with the vendor, because the customization of such complex software typically entails
vulnerability and dependence on the vendor’(Gefen 2004,p266) . Successful implementation of ERP systems

‘requires a corporate culture that emphasizes the value of sharing common goals over individual pursuits and
the value of trust between partners, employees, managers and corporations’ (Somers and Nelson 2001). The
consequences of lack of trust can be severe; as problems and delays mount, trust relations become strained leading to a circle of suspicion and disbelief which is both destructive and hard to break out of (Gefen 2004;
Nah and Delgado 2006; Schlichter & Rose 2009). When trust does not exist in an implementation project,
much effort must be directed into control, regulation and documentation.
The understanding of trust in this literature is also primarily taxonomic - trust is a property with different
facets or categories. Trust is deterrence-based, knowledge-based or identification-based (Lander et al 2004);
process-based, characteristic-based or institution-based (Gefen 2004); mutual, cognitive or swift (Scott and
Kaindl, 2000). If trust is an important component of implementation success, but absent, then trust should be
created. Various mechanisms for establishing trust are considered, including initial interactions, integrity,
predictability, communication, sharing control, concern for others, joint identification, commitment,
potential for success, and managerial decisions (Lander, Purvis et al. 2004). Trust can be built up with
intensive communication, coaching, delegation of responsibility, personal care and attention (Jarrar, AlMudimigh et al. 2000). Building trust quickly in temporary project situations is considered important
(Lander, Purvis et al. 2004), and customization companies need to behave responsively and to act in
accordance with their clients’ expectations (Gefen 2002). The present paper develops concrete
recommendations on how to re-build trust.
2.2

The Faroese IHIS project

This section presents a narrative of the case. The narrative is a synthesis of all the existing documents and
interviews and has been through a set of discussions both among the authors and during reflective meetings
with the actors interviewed, leading to revisions. Letters in parentheses indicate a reference to the trust
conditions and consequences in tables 2 and 3.
The Faroe Islands are a self-governing part of the Danish National Community with 48,000 inhabitants
distributed across 18 small islands. They lie in the North Atlantic Ocean between the Shetlands and Iceland,
with one-third of the inhabitants living in the capital, Torshavn. In total 3 hospitals and 27 general
practitioners (GPs) report to the Ministry of Health. General practitioners are self-employed, but work in
clinics supplied by the local authorities. They invoice private sickness benefit associations and co-operate
with the hospitals. Discussions about establishing an integrated healthcare information system, with the
purpose of modernising and integrating the Faroese healthcare system, began in 2000. A contract with a
supplier was signed on 3 November 2004, after feasibility studies and planning. The project was discussed in
the Faroese parliament, and the involvement of local IT firms sought. The implementation project is one of
the largest IT projects ever in the Faroese public sector, involving the complete healthcare system throughout
the community. Implementation commenced in January 2005, with completion planned for the end of 2006;
however, the project ran into difficulties and has been rescheduled several times. In March 2010 it was
expected that the IHIS would be in use in all 3 hospitals and by all the GPs.
The ministry contracted an external consultant as the project manager and in mid-2005 recruited a Chief
Information Officer (CIO). A project charter and group were established, and a series of information and
configuration meetings were held. Two pilot wards configured and installed the IHIS, and under the
guidance of the supplier’s project manager, the core system was finally configured during the spring of 2006.
A major roll-out was planned. In the second half of the year the surgical ward succeeded in configuring parts
of the system to its needs. In early 2007 the IHIS was implemented in the emergency ward at the National
Hospital, where GPs could experience it, and a few adopted it in their own practices. In September 2007 the
core system was formally taken over by the Faroese healthcare authorities and a party was thrown to
celebrate (U). The ministry bought a laboratory information system, a blood bank system and a digital x-ray
system to be integrated with the IHIS system.
A full account of the case is given in Schlichter (2010).

2.3

Incidents

The initiatives occurred in different parts of the implementation project. The differences were analysed to
understand each initiative’s unique profile regarding breakdown and recovery, and named to illustrate the
main problems to handle.
2.3.1

Challenged workshops

One of the first activities in the implementation project was a series of configuration workshops with the
participation of healthcare professionals (doctors, nurses and secretaries), representatives from the project
organisation (project managers and technicians) and consultants from the supplier. The purpose of the
workshops was to provide the Faroese staff with an initial understanding of the IT system’s structure and
capabilities, to perform the initial configuration to localise (B) the system to the Faroese healthcare structure
and to create a foundation for the specific implementation and set-up at the individual wards and other
organisational structures. The workshops brought together many of the important actors from the project.
However, not all of the workshops were regarded as suitable for bringing the project forward by the local
actors. The workshops neither led to the desired result nor were executed in an effective manner: “it was not
all workshops that worked – often we missed healthcare insight by the consultants” (CEO-19).
It was claimed that the consultants did not have sufficient healthcare background (A), that they were unprepared and that they mainly had a technical background. However, it was also recognised that the users
participating in these workshops had a very low insight into the nature of information systems (A): “They did
not have any knowledge of computers – only been on a very short introductory course” (NUR-21) and it
seemed that a very large amount of configuration was needed (B). These issues led to workshops where the
Faroese actors could not understand what was going on (A), and were ready to leave the project because they
could not see how the goals of the project could ever be reached with the amount of resources allocated to
the project (D): “I believe this requires more resources than available – and foreseen” (HD-24).
During the workshops major part of the actors also questioned the IHIS’s influence on issues such as
privacy and security, but received no actual feedback on these issues (E): “A lot of rumors were around
about lack of privacy and security – could a reasonable level be reached?” (PM-20). The IHIS as such also
seemed unstable and difficult to use (C) with no assistance (helpdesk) available: “… everything gets
registered in the journal – it is not at all to understand …” and “we do not know where to get assistance
easy” (CD-22).
After a couple of less successful workshops the supplier decided to change the approach of the workshops,
firstly by appointing consultants with healthcare experience to manage the workshops (Q) and secondly by
letting their own consultants take care of a larger part of the initial set-up than planned (O, R). At the same
time a CIO was appointed for the first time to head the information systems in the Department of Health.
One of the first actions by the CIO was to agree with the supplier to establish a so-called “sandbox” (O, Q),
where the future end-users could try to set up and configure an almost fully functioning replica of the IHIS,
thus being able to become acquainted with the system by working with a “real” IT system instead of only
abstract paperwork (P, R).
2.3.2

Slow progress

After the successful recovery from the initial workshops the hard work began to configure the IHIS
according to the actual situation and (maybe) re-engineer the working procedures at the wards. Based on
what was learnt by super users (representing the end-users) and a few centrally placed IT people during the
initial workshops, the idea was that the actors on the Faroese side of the implementation project should be
able to configure the information system themselves with only minor support from the supplier. They should
“work on their own”, which was more difficult than foreseen (G); it was especially difficult to match (or
adapt) the built routines of the IHIS with what was actually happening on the wards: “We have worked a lot
to configure the system and it was an enormous effort to match the system with our processes” (CIO-33).

During the delayed process of configuration some issues emerged. First of all it now seemed impossible to
finalise the implementation of the first wards according to the planned schedule (F). Next the group of actors
performing the configuration also found technical problems (“bugs”) in the software (C) and mismatches
between the software delivered and the requirements from the contract (B), especially related to privacy
issues (E) and payment procedures (G): “My main requirement as GP was to be able to issue invoices and
prescriptions but I have had problems to communicate with other users, system failures, crashes and so on”
(GP-14).
When the group experienced these problems they could not gain timely assistance since no support
organisation was in place (C). The supplier claimed that the only way to solve these issues was to upgrade
the standard software to a new version, leading to the often-seen problems when upgrading software during
an implementation process. The stressful mix of discussions on who should pay for the costs related to
delays (F) and upgrades and the heavy delay to the project caused (F) worried discussions among all the
actors on the future of the project; had the authorities entered a project that could be neither finalised nor
fully financed (D)? “It is factual that the project is though for the participants. For this reason you can feel
fed up with it; that it goes on forever and no results are met” (PM-31).
All these issues called for heavy actions to re-establish trust among all the actors. The executive management
decided to take a “time out” and a meeting was set up in Denmark with the participation of the project
managers and lawyers from the parties, an external consultant and deputy directors (O): “It was a nice
meeting. I felt the air was cleansed and the process revitalized. Some results were the question of up-grade
and who should pay for extra work” (DM-028).
As a result of the meeting the suppliers’ project manager was replaced with a more experienced person who
had also been a part of the initial pre-analysis phase; a full-time configuration consultant was deployed to the
Faroe Islands for a period of time; and principles of the issue of splitting the cost were agreed. During her
stay the configuration consultant was able to balance the IHIS to the professional needs of the end-users (Q,
P). The deployed consultant took part in the initial phase to set up a local support organisation with related
procedures (R): “… she [the consultant] took leadership in the configuration and to set up procedures related
to maintenance, support, helpdesk and so on” (PM-043).
2.3.3

Squeezed core actors

With assistance from the configuration consultant the full span of the core parts of the IHIS was in place.
The Faroese healthcare authorities now had an IHIS fully localised in their own organisation and ready to be
implemented at the different wards. The core configured system was formally tested, accepted and taken
over, which was celebrated (U) by speeches and partying: “… earlier this year we took over the system
because we have got the deliveries bought. We showed our joy by a huge party – the participants reacted
quite positive on this” (CIO-33).
A new group of coming end-users (super users) was now activated to act as local representatives in the
ongoing implementation process (T).
As almost all the wards (and specialities) were now activated, the workload of the Faroese project manager
became greater and greater (D). The project manager should also take care of the more technical aspects of
the implementation, such as the IT infrastructure as well as supervising the high number of locally placed
super users (I). The super users felt squeezed between their (normal, daily) roles as nurses and secretaries
and being a formal part of the project organisation (H): “… yes, the relations are worn. The originally group
is gone, exists no more. The new group has to be trained. That’s a huge task – and suddenly one more shows
up” (NUR-42).
Both the PM and the super users felt that the workload and the amount of conflicts (I) were far too high and
lost their trust in their own abilities to fulfil their obligations. This was underpinned by the fact that the
funding for compensating the end-users for their participation in the implementation project was quickly
fading away (D). It was in this period of time that the end-users really experienced the new IHIS and how the
implementation of it formalised and institutionalised the life at the wards (J) and that the end-users

experienced problems and flows in their daily use of the IHIS: “… it is a natural part of the implementation
process. They have to decide on changes in workflows. Some will have to spend more time before the
screen, some will face challenges to change into something unknown as flows disappear and new are
established” (CIO044).
During this phase of the project the PM resigned and a major part of the super users decided to cancel their
participation in the implementation.
The situation was once more serious and something had to be done to rescue the project. A new time out was
taken during which the project was heavily rescheduled, new funding was granted and a new PM with
experience of working with organisational changes and development (O, Q) at the hospital was hired. Also, it
was decided to employ new super users (P, T) in the project and physically place these in the Department of
Health together with the other IT staff and central parts of the implementation project (H,O,T): “They [the
project staff] were moved up into the Department of Health. Four coordinators in all – they became an
integrated part of the project implementation organisation. Actually this led to more resources and a more
agile organisation” (CIO-44).
The centrally placed staff began to celebrate their progress at their morning breakfast meetings each time
they made progress together with end-users and when they reported progress to the steering committee (U).
2.4

Consequences of breakdowns

Table 1 accumulates the immediate observations of breakdowns and the actual actions taken in the project
seen in the text above. For each of the three incidents we show what was observed, the action taken by the
project and which aspect was in focus during the actions.
Table 1: Three trust breakdown incidents
Incident
(1) Challenged
workshops
(2) Slow progress

(3) Squeezed core
actors

3

Observation
Inexperienced consultants
IT system not really ready for
configuration
Lack of functionality
Only minor progress of configuration
Dispute regarding payment of “extras”
Core participants squeezed between roles
and feeling lonely at wards
Very high workload and doubt regarding
roles and own qualifications
PM resigns

Action
Consultants replaced
Sandbox established
Core IT system upgraded
Consultants deployed
Meeting among managers
arranged
Place core staff together
Establish meetings at wards
Reschedule to a realistic
plan
Employ a PM with hospital
experience

Focus on
Actors’ satisfactory
meeting with the
project
Maintain momentum
Save the project
The “effective” project
Deteriorating selfconfidence of the
project manager and
other central staff

THE CONSEQUENCES OF TRUST CONDITIONS

Above we saw examples of incidents in the project related to the breakdown of trust. Different situations of
breakdowns and recovery actions were presented. To identify explicitly the consequences of the breakdowns,
the interviews were analysed to locate statements and stories related to the three breakdowns. For each
incident we identified and consolidated the negative trust condition (understood as the qualities of the
situation observed) and the consequences of the negative trust condition. Please refer to table 2 below.

Reference to the
actual incident

Table 2: Negative trust conditions and consequences

1

12

12
123
2
2

23
3
3
3

Negative trust condition

IT immaturity amongst users and/or
low insight into the actual IHIS or Faroese
context by the consultants
Standardised IHIS built for a different context
and needing much configuration
Usability and operational difficulties with
IHIS
Resource shortages
Greater transparency of digitalised
information in IHIS
Project delays

Dissatisfaction with implementation by users
Absence of a prior relationship between IT
professionals and users
Many diverse stakeholder groups
Formalisation and institutionalisation of work
practice and documentation (medical
journals)

Negative trust consequence

Reference in
text to
“incidents”
from the case

Suspicion of the new system, insecurity,
unwillingness to collaborate

A

Lack of confidence in the system and system
supplier, forced work practice changes and
workarounds
Lack of confidence in the system, slow learning
curve, work disruption
Lack of confidence in the achievement of project
goals
Worry about accountability, privacy, surveillance

B

Lack of confidence in schedules and deadlines,
lack of a sense of urgency in the progressing
project
Breakdown of project staff morale
Need to establish trust relations, limited social
capital, limited tolerance of divergent viewpoints
Communication difficulties, interest conflicts,
cognitive overload especially for project staff
Suspicion of management control, insecurity over
own practice, adaptation and change difficulties

C
D
E
F

G
H
I
J

From table 2 it can be seen that a specific trust condition (e.g. “resource shortages”) can relate to more than
one incident of trust breakdown.
Table 3 below provides a list of positive trust conditions and related consequences as seen after trust was reestablished in the three trust breakdown incidents. References are given to: 1) the negative trust condition(s)
that is (are) “solved” when the positive trust condition is achieved and 2) the text in the narrative where the
positive condition can be located.

Table 3: Positive trust conditions and consequences after intervention and related to negative trust
conditions
Negative trust
condition
A C E
I

Related positive trust condition after
intervention
Increase in the quantity and quality of
personal contact with and between actors

A

J

Many opportunities for users to
experience the IHIS

J

Emerging work benefits through the use
of the IHIS

E

B

G

A C

F

BC

Tailoring of IHIS to users’ work routines

D F H
D

4

Rapid and flexible response to user
support

G

Restructured and better-resourced project
organisation
Repeated small project successes

Related
positive trust consequence
Better communication between
stakeholders with diverse interests,
increased social capital
Confidence in own ability to understand
and negotiate the system and incorporate
it into own work routines
Confidence in the system’s ability to
contribute work advantages that outweigh
the teething troubles and start-up
difficulties
Confidence in the project group’s ability
to know and hear users and act on their
behalf
Confidence in the project group’s ability
to understand local medical work routines
and adapt the system accordingly
Internal project confidence and role
security, better communication with users
Confidence in the ability of the project to
meet its goals, despite setbacks and delays

Reference
to case
O

P

Q

R

S

T
U

THE MANAGEMENT OF TRUST

The Faroese implementation project survived the five years of struggling and managed to recover many
times from serious trust breakdowns. Many reasons exist for this. Our analysis suggests, however, that
substantive parts of the breakdowns could have been avoided by being proactive and adopting more
appropriate recovery tactics at earlier points in time.
The narrative of the Faroese IHIS implementation project, including the observations of negative and
positive trust conditions and consequences (as documented in tables 2 and 3), was presented in a half-day
seminar in March 2010. The seminar had the participation of representatives from hospital management,
doctors, nurses and secretaries as well as high-level management from the Ministry of Health (cabinet
minister, deputy minister and department chairs) and from the supplier. During the seminar the participants
developed more than 30 recommendations for concrete actions to be taken to move from a negative to a
positive trust condition in the presented trust breakdowns. By critically reading, analysing and discussing the
narrative and the recommendations, 4 propositions on how to recover from trust breakdowns emerge. For
each proposition the related set of actions is shown with supportive citations from the seminar.
The first proposition is about how to (re-)establish better communication and achieve internal project
confidence and role security:
(1) When trust disappears or is reaching a low level arrange physical face-to-face meetings and reestablish trust by physically placing core team members in the same location.
As we see in the case, trust in the successful completion of the project can often be restored be letting the
actors meet face to face around project activities (references O and T in the narrative). During the seminar
many statements such as: “Let them work together and meet each other” and “Let the resource persons from
the initial implementations stay within the frame of the project to learn and develop themselves” were given
by high as well as lower management.

The second proposition addresses the question of support to the people’s participation in the implementation
project.
(2) The actors should meet and use realistic data and procedures in the system from their first experience
with it and must continuously have access to a support organisation where they can gain qualified
help at the level where they are at that specific moment in the project.
When the actors have good experiences of using or meeting the information technology system as such, an
effective base for the re-establishment and maintenance of their belief in the success of the implementation
project is present (references O, P, Q, R and T in the narrative). Especially actors from the wards stated that
when the project came into trouble it was very beneficial for their level of trust that the project management
began to focus on support and on being realistic in their talks about the project. One nurse said: “Actually
provide support timely to configurators and users” and another urged the management to: “Be realistic – also
during set-up, test and regarding data”.
The third proposition relates to the demonstration of trust in the actors and hence their self-confidence.
(3) Take direct action to establish a high level of trust in and around an implementation project. Show
and demonstrate trust in the actors. Do not overly pin-point, disclose and discuss problems with all
the actors. Actively work to ensure the actors believe in their own capability to complete their tasks.
Train and educate actors continuously.
An implementation project anchored in an environment with a high level of trust is effective. When the
actors’ trust in the project turns to mistrust or reaches a low level several things happen: since initiatives to
overcome the mistrust are taken overheads are introduced. The implementation project as such becomes less
able to cope with actors not physically or mentally close to each other, thus being less effective (references T
and S in the narrative). The top management said, “Believe in the project, also in troubled times” and
explained the positive experiences when “The directors talked positive about the project”. However, also in
the present situation the local actors urged the management to “Be ‘open’ about problems” and to “Arrange
frequent meetings face to face among users, suppliers and project team” to support their belief in their own
abilities. One group stressed: “Remember to educate super users and configuration team, also when in
trouble”.
The fourth proposition looks at the concept and importance of success:
(4) Constantly highlight and even inject frequent small successes. Remember to celebrate successes.
When actors experience frequent small successes during the implementation project their trust in a successful
implementation is partly maintained and their self-confidence is reinforced (reference U in the narrative).
“We need to stage and celebrate successes”, as some department managers said.

5

CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

During the present analysis we have established a set of lessons learned on how to recover from the
breakdown of trust during an implementation project by analysing the actions leading from negative
conditions to positive trust conditions. The lessons learned (formulated above as propositions) can be
reformulated as concrete actions, which when applied will greatly enhance the chances of reaching the goals
of the project when in a situation that is challenged by a breakdown of trust:
1. Introduce, increase and maintain face-to-face events and procedures
2. Establish (or enhance) a well-functioning support organisation
3. Assure that the support organisation is always available when needed
4. Demonstrate trust in the actors to enhance their self-confidence
5. Celebrate successes, even the smallest or ones injected by yourself
In this paper we have
 Augmented existing literature by showing the relations between the lessons learned and the negative
trust conditions they can assist in solving.
 Provided recommendations for practice for project managers and alike.
The study presented in this paper stems from a single longitudinal case study. We claim that the findings are
a valid of example “generalisation to theory” (Yin, 2003), which can be understood as a combination of
“theory building” and an “other settings” generalisation. The internal validity has been secured by a strict
system of coding and reference points. The case presents a typical implementation of an information system
in a complex but quite well-known setting: a National Health Service set-up. The study is a unique
longitudinal case covering the entire healthcare system in a country. Furthermore, the constructs analysed in
the case – trust and the recovery of trust – are not different from those seen in other settings; the only real
challenge we have identified is related to cultural aspects and the fact that the case is from an island-based
community that may have its own norms and ways of handling trust. For these reasons it could be interesting
to broaden this single case study to other situations and cultural settings, or even to focus on cultural-based
differences of trust relations.
A natural step forward from the formulation of these four critical success factors would be to develop a
methodology for measuring the level of trust formally. It would be useful to offer this as a “tool” such that
the project manager can identify problematic issues and apply guidelines from the recommendations above
(Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000). It could also be interesting to investigate or test the actions’ relative
importance or impact in different environments.
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